This note was sent to my institutional clients on November 14, 2019. I am distributing it on Substack to provide a background for upcoming geopolitical notes.
· This is the first in a series of three notes discussing the collisions taking place in the Middle East between a variety of spheres of influence.
· Divisions are taking place within countries based on the spheres of influence of outside powers. Sykes-Picot will stand, as it has for a century, but the importance of the lines on the map continues to decline.
· A land bridge is needed to move the large numbers of troops and equipment Iran wants to be able to rapidly deploy anywhere across the “Shia Crescent”. Iran has planned two separate routes, but in both cases, events have moved against their plans.
· It appears the IRGC did not plan the Southern Route expecting Donald Trump to become president. The “withdrawal” of U.S. forces to the oilfields of Deir al-Zur puts a very power unfriendly force right at the most vulnerable point on Iran’s land bridge.
Revolutionaries
Three camps with wildly diverging interests have formed in the Middle East and the stakes are rising as Syria, Iraq and Yemen are carved up into spheres of influence. The first camp, effectively the pan-Arabist camp, includes the Gulf monarchies and the military leaderships of Egypt, Libya and Sudan[1]. In 2015, the Saudis tried to unite all Sunni governments to face Iran and its allies as a single front. However, as I wrote at the time[2], this strategy was destined to fail because it required ideological adversaries to join forces. There was no chance that the leadership of Turkey and Qatar, major promoters of political Islam, could work with the pan-Arabist, anti-Islamist leadership of Egypt and Abu Dhabi. As I expected, the Saudis chose to stick with an Arab identity rather than a Sunni Islamist one.
The Sunni Islamist camp is led by Qatar and Turkey and includes numerous Islamist groups. The goal of this camp is to aggregate power by promoting Islamist forms of government across the Middle East, Africa and central Asia. The method chosen is to support groups interested in implementing a government guided by Islamic laws. The groups supported range from political parties in democracies to revolutionaries fighting dictatorships. Turkey also has the immediate goal of securing domestic security by creating a buffer area against unfriendly states and groups.
Finally, there is the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran, which includes Hezbollah, Syria and Hamas. Iran’s foreign policy veered toward sectarianism in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011 as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sought revolutionary allies. The Houthis in Yemen, who have become reluctant members out of need for support, are a perfect example. Iran adopted the “Axis of Resistance” strategy out of necessity because only opposition groups were interested in revolutionary rhetoric.
The leadership of Iran and Hezbollah are motivated by domestic interests, of course, but there is a genuine desire to spread Iran’s version of Islamism. They are unabashedly revolutionary and expansionist and since 1979 their leadership has not given up spreading their brand of theocratic governance.
However, Iran and Hezbollah are alone in viewing absolute dictatorship by a religious cleric as a desirable form of government. In Sunni Islam it is frowned upon when religious leaders become directly involved in the governing process (as opposed to commenting on policy) and, aside from Hezbollah, Shia in the Arab world have rejected totalitarian theocratic government[3].
In sum, one reactionary camp and two revolutionary camps have formed in the Middle East and the defeat of Islamic State brought the interests of those camps into direct conflict with each other. Gulf monarchies and pan-Arabist military dictatorships are terrified another wave of Islamic populism will wash them away. For those men, the stakes are literally life-or-death - they will act accordingly. For the revolutionaries, inciting change by whatever means necessary is the only way to benefit from regional chaos.
The Sound of Metal on Metal
The state of near anarchy in the Middle East has triggered two types of reactions. Some closed off and sought security, while others saw opportunity in the chaos and are willing to take more risk. At this point, the geopolitical realignment taking place can only be described as “post-unipolar”. In the post-unipolar world, the U.S. remains the largest aggregate holder of power, but other actors have and use power within their niches. The ultimate goal for non-U.S. actors is to achieve autonomy, which is independence and the ability to take action and affect outcomes. While the realignment is taking place, actors achieve as much autonomy as they can while also expanding their sphere of influence by developing more client states. Isolation is a death sentence for any nation, autonomous region or non-state group.
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a near absence of inter-state wars. In a unipolar environment, the superpower intervenes if the risk of state-to-state warfare starts to rise. But in a post-unipolar environment, there is no single entity to take that role. As a result, internationalizing civil wars becomes the weapon of choice for nations looking to expand their influence and autonomy.
Non-state actors are popular among the community of nations because they fill multiple needs. They provide smaller states a tool to challenge larger ones, while maintaining plausible deniability. They also allow more powerful states to influence outcomes with a lower risk of inter-state warfare. During a geopolitical realignment, non-state groups fill power vacuums and allow nations to advance their agenda without coming into direct conflict with another nation. Non-state groups serve as the “grease” between nations as they adjust. In Syria and Iraq, the non-state groups are being mopped up and nations are staking claims on Syrian territory. Without non-state groups between them, nations will be scraping against each other with no grease.
Wahhabism and Revolutionary Islamism
The realpolitik that goes on between the nations of Saudi Arabia and Iran is a conflict of statecraft where the U.S. can balance interests to avoid an armed conflict. But there is a very real and bitter divide between the rival theocratic establishments. A divide that cannot be resolved by statecraft. In 2016, Mohammed Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran since 2013, wrote an opinion piece in the New York Times titled “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism”. Ouch. The piece goes on to liken Wahhabism to a plague and declares the sect a theological perversion. The article was written at a flashpoint of tensions between the Saudis and Iran. Eight days earlier the Saudis executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a senior Shia cleric. In Iran Khamenei promised “divine revenge” and protesters in Tehran stormed the Saudi embassy and set it on fire.
Wahhabism for its part teaches that Shiism is dangerous and deviant, making Iran an arch enemy by default. Saudi Arabia’s top cleric Grand Mufti Abd al-Aziz said that “… [the Iranian regime] are not Muslims. … Their hostility to Muslims is ancient, specifically with Sunnis.” The leadership in Iran countered by declaring Wahhabism “takfir”, which implies the Saudis are extremists outside of Islam, rather than proper Sunnis.
Khomeini’s decision to allow the dovish Hassan Rouhani to become president in 2013 an effort to de-isolate Iran from the West so it would be free to take more action in Syria and across the Middle East. President Rouhani planned to take foreign policy away from the IRGC and return it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goal was to have a national foreign policy, rather than a militarist agenda. Policy doves pushed to retake control of foreign policy by integrating IRGC goals into an institutional framework, but they pushed too hard. Khomeini and the IRGC pushed back hard and went ahead with the “Axis of Resistance” narrative. The Supreme Leader overruled the Iranian President at the request of Qassim Soleimani (Quds Force commander) because the sectarian angle provides the militarists a convenient justification for using force to protect national interests and the safety of Shia across the region.
The possibility of an expansionist power in Iran conquering Arab tribes divided against each other is very real for the Arab world - it would not be the first time. Going back to the Safavid Empire (1502-1736 AD), expansionist empires from the Iranian Plateau have periodically conquered portions of the Arab world. The maps below show the expansion and contraction of Safavid territory as it struggled with the Ottoman Empire for control of the Arab world.
Expansionist Iran
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) convinced Iran’s leaders that for their revolution to succeed, it must spread. Iran’s leadership tried to spread its ideology across the Muslim world by funding non-state opposition groups. Most groups only took money or material support, but Hezbollah adopted Khomeinist ideology whole hog. Hezbollah stands as Iran’s most important external asset and the greatest achievement of the IRGC.
The religious aspect of the revolution in Iran has tied Iranian nationalism to Islamism and presented Shia Islam as Iran’s true political system. Under that system, the Supreme Leader controls all branches of government and can veto all decisions. In practice, the Supreme Leader sets limits, but otherwise government entities are able to pursue their mandate as they see fit. In the case of the IRGC, an aggressively sectarian military organization accountable only to the Supreme Leader has managed to accrue power across the government and sets the agenda for foreign policy
Iran’s foreign policy remains shaped by the 1979 revolution, which gave birth to the IRGC. The Iranian leadership operates under the assumption that foreign powers, especially the U.S., want to overthrow the theocratic leadership. Saddam’s invasion immediately after the revolution seemed to bear out the regime’s assumptions. Iran’s only friend at the time was Syria because Assad the elder hated Saddam.
The Role of the IRGC
The commander of Revolutionary Guard’s Quds force (basically an amalgamation of the CIA, special forces and tip of the spear operations), Major General Qassim Soleimani, has fully embraced a sectarian strategy. He sees Iran’s power emanating from the “greatness of the Islamic Revolution” and (in his view) the positive impact the revolution had on the “cherished Shiite faith”. Soleimani sees a successful Shia-led government in Iraq as key to advancing the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC is a manifestation of the Iranian exceptionalist ideology that creates problems in the region. Iranian exceptionalists view Iran as the leader of the Muslim world and promote a Shiite-focused foreign policy. The Iranian leadership takes for granted that the world’s Shia will follow their lead.
The IRGC has taken cross-border steps to promote international Shiism. For example, the creation of the Fatimaiyun Brigade was billed as raising soldiers of Islam. The unit is made up of illegal Afghan immigrants fighting for pay as well as residency and work permits. The names of the units and the symbology of their unit logos are overtly Shia. These militia send a clear message to Sunnis wherever they go about who is in charge.
Even though a united Shia front is far from a reality, the IRGC has been happy to promote the view. They seek to present the Houthis rebelling in Yemen and the Shia protesting in Saudi Arabia as proof that all Shia stand together against the Sunni nations. In reality, the proxy fights Iran has engaged in (i.e. Assad, Houthis, Hamas, etc.) have been fights for survival against much stronger enemies with only Iran willing to provide support.
The IRGC is acting in anticipation of conflict with the U.S., even if not a full-blown war, by upgrading equipment and leadership. In 2019 numerous high-level staff have been moved around and a separate “Air Defense Force” was created within the army. In April a group of senior officers in the inspection and strategic affairs divisions were fired and subsequently fled the country.
Valuable Real Estate
I wrote in 2017 that, contrary to media and market consensus, the geopolitical situation would become significantly more dangerous after Islamic State had been defeated[4]. The group’s black flag had created a black hole that would suck in outside powers looking to gain a strategic advantage in the region.
The road stretching from Damascus to Aleppo to Mosul is one of the most strategically important strips of asphalt in the world (Map B). The area is a crossroads between three continents and is large and flat enough to accommodate an army of conquest. For this reason, Syria has throughout history usually been controlled by the dominant state in the region. The current 73-year period of independence is historically unusual.
In the game of empires, it is crucial to have a large population to draw military manpower from without causing a significant drop in economic output. Sustaining a large population usually requires the ability to produce a large volume of food to feed that population. Obviously, the limiting factor to food production in the Middle East is generally water. Turkey, Egypt and Iran are all roughly the same size in terms of population. Control of the large population of Iraq, especially for Iran, provides a major boost to the ability to make war (Map C). Iraq and Syria are caught in the middle of a three-way tug-of-war for control of the terrain and the population of the Levant (Map D).
Bridges Made of Sand
Without a compliant Syria the Islamic Republic would be isolated and very limited in its ability to project power. In contrast, Turkey wants a friendly non-Assad Syria that provides a gateway to the Arab world. Turkey was the first nation to support the Syrian rebels and Iran was the first to back Assad.
As is the case with Russia, Iran’s intervention was about keeping an important ally in power. But the stakes are a lot higher for Iran than for Russia. Iran needs not only to keep Assad in power but also to solidify the east-west links between Iran and Lebanon. These east-west links are a lifeline for Iran’s client/partner Hezbollah, which is a lynchpin of Iranian security. Hezbollah’s 100,000 rockets provide strategic depth by holding Israel and the U.S. at bay.
A quote by Ali Khedery[5] in The Guardian best sums up importance of the Tehran-Damascus land bridge[6].
“It signifies the consolidation of Iran’s control over Iraq and the Levant, which in turn confirms [its] hegemonic regional ambitions. That should trouble every western leader and our regional allies because this will further embolden Iran to continue expanding, likely into the Gulf countries next, a goal they have explicitly and repeatedly articulated.”
Iran has long sought an alliance with the Alawites in Syria, partly out of confessional sympathy, and partly as a land bridge to Hezbollah. When Assad violently cracked down on protestors there was discord among the Iranian elite whether to support the regime. The IRGC’s “Axis of Resistance” narrative won and was endorsed by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Subsequently, the Iranian government broadened the justification of the war to include ideological goals (i.e. ethnic and sectarian) as well as geopolitical (i.e. vs. Saudi/USA).
A land bridge is needed to move the large numbers of troops and equipment Iran wants to be able to rapidly deploy anywhere across the “Shia Crescent”. The rail networks in Syria and Iraq are in shambles and too easy to sabotage or cut with airstrikes. In contrast, truck convoys can show a false flag to avoid airstrikes and blend in with local activity when not moving. An air bridge to Syria would be easily cut and prohibitively expensive - even if Russia guaranteed safe passage. Iran is concerned that Russia will use Syria as a bargaining chip with the West so no plans can be made assuming Russian air support.
Two very interesting and independently produced reports by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and The Guardian investigate efforts by Iran and its proxies to secure a land route from Tehran to Damascus (and presumably to the Mediterranean via Latakia)[7]. Map E shows the route as it was originally planned - the “Northern Route”.
The plan was to avoid Islamic State-controlled territory by passing through territory controlled by the Syrian Kurdish group YPG (an affiliate of PKK) to Aleppo and then down the M5 highway through the province of Idlib. The route avoids the Zagros Mountains that straddle the Iran-Iraq-Turkey borders. The Iranian Kurdish separatists - PJAK – operate in the area and would find the route an inviting target.
The Northern Route also passes through parts of northern Iraq that Turkey considers within its sphere of influence. The government of Iraqi Kurdistan strongly objected, saying that it did not want Kurdistan to become a conduit for weapons and troops sent to Syria. Iran also approached the Marxist Kurdish group PKK to provide safe passage from Iraq to Syria through the Mount Sinjar area into areas held by the Syrian Kurds, but the deal fell through. Idlib is not likely to fall back into regime hands anytime soon and Turkey is now active in northern Syria. The Northern Route would be impossible to secure, so it is out.
Map F below shows the “Southern Route”. The new route turns south at Tal Afar and crosses the Iraqi-Syria border at the newly opened Abu Kamal border crossing. The change in route also explains Iran’s willingness to agree to a de-escalation zone in Idlib despite previous statements that it did not support a divided Syria. This route was designed to avoid territory held by YPG entirely, which requires moving up the Euphrates River Valley to the city of Deir al-Zur, a regional transportation hub, located in the province of the same name.
The route was secure while the U.S. was focused on fighting Islamic State and protecting YPG from Turkey. It appears the IRGC did not plan the route expecting Donald Trump to become president. The “withdrawal” of U.S. forces to the oilfields of Deir al-Zur puts a very power unfriendly force right at the most vulnerable point on Iran’s land bridge. All roads in eastern Syria lead to the city of Deir al-Zur because there are very few roads in the province of Deir al-Zur. An American force within striking distance of Deir al-Zur puts the viability of Iran’s grand project at risk.
The U.S. has a powerful presence in Deir al-Zur and on the Syria-Iraq border. In 2016, as part of the fight against Islamic State, the Marines build Firebase Bell about one mile from the Iraq-Syria border. The base housed about 200 marines, four 155mm howitzers and 100 special forces troops. The firebase was used to support the assault on Mosul and pound any Islamic State troops trying to escape through the desert into Syria. In 2018 the base was brought back up and running by the US Army for use against Islamic State fighters from fleeing Syria into Iraq.
After ordering the “withdrawal” from Syria, Trump suggested that if “the Kurds” wanted protection they should head for “the oilfields”. The area is mostly Arab but is controlled by Kurdish forces, making the idea ridiculous on its face. This writer views the President’s statement as a tell that he – a strong proponent of disengagement – has agreed to the U.S. military indefinitely controlling strategically important assets in eastern Syria. As part of the “withdrawal” from Syria, the US is leaving behind a portion of an armored brigade to “guard” Syria’s Omar oilfield (Map G). The force includes up to thirty Abrams tanks and all the support that goes with them, including air support. The American firebases along the Iraq-Syria border and in Deir al-Zur are rocks that no man shall move.
The “withdrawal” from Syria is better described as a redeployment to areas that matter regionally, rather than areas that matter for the Syrian civil war. The U.S. presence in northern Syria was a weakness because U.S. soldiers were targets but had to take great care not to kill any Iranians. It is better to control areas of strategic interests to the United States, regardless of whether controlling those areas promotes freedom and democracy. Trump repeatedly said that regime change was off the table and ended CIA aid to rebels in Idlib. The President asked his advisors for a withdrawal plan and all the plans produced included some form of American presence in a nation-building capacity. The result was an angry and ill-advised reaction from the President.
After a cooling down period, the Administration elected to conduct a redeployment and call it a withdrawal. The redeployment of U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq has positioned them to guard American interests rather than create a new America in the Middle East (Map H). The highways, the Euphrates and the oilfields. Those are the resources that matter in southeastern Syria and northwest Iraq. Hearts and minds are for a bygone era.
Iran is also having trouble securing the portion of the land bridge in Iraq, which they thought they already had in hand. The security of the portion of the land bridge in northern Iraq is questionable given Turkey’s quiet invasion. Turkey has an understanding with the ruling political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. The government of Iraqi Kurdistan gives Turkey license to pursue PKK forces into Iraq in exchange for financial, technical and diplomatic support. Erdogan has said he intends to take the offensive right to PKK headquarters in the Qandil Mountain range (Maps I & J). Those mountains happen to be right on the Iraq-Iran border (Map K). If that occurs, not only will Iran’s land bridge not be secure, but there will be security issues on its own borders.
Conclusion
The announcement of a “withdrawal” of U.S. forces from Syria might have given Iran’s leadership hope that their goal of a secure land bridge was within reach. In Syria, the Assad regime is stable, leaving more troops and militia available for Iran to advance its wider agenda. The IRGC has had success in capturing and securing territory along the Euphrates valley and the highway that runs along it. The border crossing at Abu Kamel is functioning, allowing military supplies to move rapidly from Iran to Syria and Lebanon.
However, events have very quickly moved against Iran. First, the withdrawal turned out to be a redeployment that much better serves American interests. The withdrawal to bases in northwestern Iraq and near the Deir al-Zur oilfields puts American forces right on top of Iran’s land bridge. Second, political events in Iraq are quickly spinning out of Iran’s control and there might be an overthrow of the government and possible an intra-Shia civil war.
The most interesting aspect of the current realignment of power in the Middle East is that the original national borders are not being changed. Instead, they are simply being ignored. Divisions are taking place within countries based on the spheres of influence of outside powers. Sykes-Picot will stand, as it has for a century, but the importance of the lines on the map continues to decline. There will also continue to be a central government of the nation of Iraq, but the area that it actually governs will continue to shrink and sub-divide. At what point does a nation stop being a nation and start being a tribe? That is a question that will need answering in the next several years.
Part Two of this series will discuss the political situation in Iraq and the implications of the change from an ethno-sectarian society to a socio-economic society currently taking place. Part Three will discuss the looming collision of Turkey and Iran that is coming in northern Iraq. Foreign military adventures with the goal of killing Marxist Kurds is a winning election mandate in Turkey and Erdogan is a good enough politician to not let an election winner slip by.
[1] See my Connolly Insight note “Escalating Risks in the Middle East, Part 1” of 1 June 2017
[2] See my note “The Red Sea, the White Nile, and the Blue Peoples” of 20 July 2019
[3] See my Connolly Insight note “Saudi Arabia: Sunni or Arab?” of 23 December 2015
[4] See my note “The King, The Sultan, and The Caliphate” of 24 February 2017.
[5] He was the longest continuously serving American official in Iraq, from 2003 to 2009, and acted as a special assistant to five U.S. ambassadors and as a senior adviser to three heads of U.S. Central Command. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Khedery
[6] See: “Iran changes course of road to Mediterranean coast to avoid US forces”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/iran-changes-course-of-road-to-mediterranean-coast-to-avoid-us-forces
[7] See: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-may-be-using-iraq-and-syria-as-a-bridge-to-lebanon and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/iran-changes-course-of-road-to-mediterranean-coast-to-avoid-us-forces