· For investors, the likelihood of the world returning to some sense of order depends heavily on American policymakers taking Russia seriously, rather than acting like “tough guys”. The sooner the conflict in Ukraine can be brought to an end by removing the threat to Russia, the less damage will be done to the post-Cold War order.
· The clock is ticking for Putin to stitch together a rump USSR before the Muslim population vastly outnumbers the Slavic population. Also note that, at seventy-years old, Putin is over the average life expectancy for Russian men. The clock is ticking for him personally.
· For Russia, there are undeniable benefits to using force in Ukraine - even after taking account of wide-ranging sanctions by the West. As policymaking shifted from the Greatest Generation to the Baby Boomers during the Clinton Administration, a “Great Carelessness” ensued. Putin wants to remake the global security environment; he was going to need to upset the apple cart at some point.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is how surprised everyone was, including this writer, that it occurred. Near-universal surprise occurred despite a year of clear diplomatic signaling that military action was coming and a well-reported buildup of forces for months preceding the start of the war. Russia’s intense interest in controlling its security environment is no surprise, but the timing of the invasion seemed strange. The natural response from those expected to have answers who were caught by surprise, as usual, was that Putin is a “madman”. However, if we take a moment to consider the last thirty-years in the light of contemporary warnings made at end of the Cold War, it becomes clear that Ukraine and Russia are yet more collateral damage from America’s ill-considered “freedom agenda”. The origins of the current Ukrainian conflict in post-Cold War foreign policy, and the implications for the outcome of the war are the topics of this note.
This note was sent to Premium Plus subscribers on March 22, 2022.
Carthaginian Peace
In 1999, only 31% of Russians felt their country deserved the status of “Great Power”. By November 2015 that share had climbed to 65%. It is no coincidence that over time Russia’s foreign policy became more bellicose. In 2013, I first wrote about the coming showdown between the U.S. and Russia:
Parallels between Rome vs. Carthage and the U.S. vs. Russia are clear and should serve as an important lesson to Americans. After the economic and ideological defeat suffered during the Cold War, Russia became an economic and social basket case through the 1990s. That situation began to change with Putin’s rise to power in 2000. Putin has explicitly said his goal is to restore Russia’s status as a Great Power and that natural resources are the best way to achieve this. Indeed, in his doctoral thesis Putin complains that market reforms let the “strategic management of the natural resources complex slip from [Russia’s] hands”. As with Hannibal in ancient Carthage, this new Carthage had found a strong leader with nationalistic fervor, a desire to get even and a clear strategic plan.
Flash forward nine years and Hannibal’s army is on the march. To understand Putin’s actions, and forecast his likely next moves, we must first understand the grievances for which he seeks redress. The great disconnect between elites in Russia and those in the United States is that the prevailing attitude in the latter is that Russians have no reason to complain and should jump on the freedom bandwagon. The differing opinions can be attributed to different historical narratives that have developed on how the Cold War ended. Interestingly, and disturbingly, the situation is very much like the end of the First World War where in the time between the end of hostilities and the start of peace negotiations the attitude of the Allies shifted from “thank God it’s over” to “we won, you lost”.
There are two types of lasting peace that victors can impose. The first is a benevolent peace where the root causes of the conflict are resolved, most likely in-favor of the victor but to the satisfaction of both parties. Sadly, such happy outcomes are few. The second is a “Carthaginian” peace, referencing Rome’s destruction of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War. Fortunately, complete annihilation is generally not viewed as an acceptable strategy for victory. Unfortunately, victors still try to get as close as possible to complete victory. In the process, their treatment of the losers sows the seeds of the next conflict. Such was the case at the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, as told in Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
In the book, Keynes lays out the mindset of the Allied leadership during the Versailles negotiations. Of particular interest, for the current discussion, is his description of the motives and goals of France’s representative, Georges Clemenceau. According to Keynes’s firsthand account, each leaders’ goals were: “Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right.”, and “Clemenceau’s goal was to weaken and destroy Germany in every possible way….”
Clemenceau’s goal of weakening Germany to the fullest extent possible was not simply out of spite, but rather a view that perpetual conflict between France and Germany was inevitable and unavoidable. Keynes describes Clemenceau’s view in the following passages:
“According to this vision of the future, European history is to be a perpetual prize-fight, of which France has won this round, but of which this round is certainly not the last. Thus, as soon as this view of the world is adopted … a demand for a Carthaginian peace is inevitable, to the full extent of the momentary power to impose it.
This is the policy of an old man, whose most vivid impressions and most lively imagination are of the past and not of the future. He sees the issue in terms of France and Germany, not humanity and of European civilization struggling forwards to a new order.”
Keynes’s warning that the economic destruction and geopolitical humiliation of a defeated Germany would lead to a bad end was, sadly, very prescient. Adolf Hitler neatly sums up the reactionary Germany view in Mein Kampf:
“The Armistice of November 1918, ushered in a policy which in all human probability was bound to lead gradually to total submission. Historical examples of a similar nature show that nations which lay down their arms without compelling reasons prefer in the ensuing period to accept the greatest humiliations and extortions rather than attempt to change their fate by a renewed appeal to force.”
“Paris hoped slowly to disjoint the Reich structure. The more rapidly national honor withered away in Germany, the sooner could economic pressure and unending poverty lead to destructive political effects. Such a policy of political repression and economic plunder, carried on for ten or twenty years, must gradually ruin even the best state structure, and under certain circumstances dissolve it. And thereby the Frenchy war aim would finally be achieved.”
“As long as the eternal conflict between Germany and France is carried on only in the form of a German defense against French aggression, it will never be decided, but from year to year, from century to century, Germany will lose one position after another.”
For this writer, and many Americans of this era, it can be hard to take seriously a leader who has a life mission (kampf) other than pure self-promotion. Some people seek power because they believe they have a special gift or drive that enables achievement of some larger national goal. Recent American presidents sought higher office and then found a mission for themselves once there. Leaders such as Hitler and Putin seek power because it furthers their personal mission, which they articulated long before taking the reins of power. Putin’s statements and written arguments bear a striking resemblance to Hitler’s in that both are clearly written by men who see their life mission as salvation from national disgrace at the hand of underhanded enemies.
The End of the Affair
At the historic Helsinki Summit of 1997, President Clinton secured Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s reluctant ascent to expansion by promising billions of dollars in foreign aid and World Trade Organization Membership. The new strategy of expanding NATO into the former Warsaw Pact was not without detractors. George Keenan, the original architect of NATO’s “containment policy” against the USSR said that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post-Cold War era,” because it would “impel Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking.”
Drifting Away
Heightened levels of external threat tend to breed “garrison states”. For countries with less-than-perfect records on political freedom a vicious circle of internal political closure and external threats from democracies can develop, driving a nation into authoritarianism. Russian elites see the post-Cold War international environment as a threat to their survival. The official statements, state media, and elite policy circles all present a worldview where the U.S. has marched relentlessly to the Russian border and used force to overthrow rivals.
After the fall of the USSR, the discrepancy in military spending between Russia and the U.S. became massive in favor of the U.S. Meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact dissolved while NATO continued to expand closer and closer to Russia’s borders. That would have been worrying enough for Russia’s elite, but a shift in U.S. foreign policy took place to define foreign democratization and human rights as primary national security interests. This policy explicitly advocates for interference in the internal affairs of the states, and it receives strong bipartisan support in the United States.
The critical turning point for the Russians was NATO’s offensive operations in Kosovo in 1999. The USSR and Yugoslavia were similar enough that the fate of the later frightened the Russian elite. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia showed Russia that the West was willing to act without UN approval. The link between external military power and internal political opposition came to be seen as a new model of hybrid warfare. The idea that internal opposition could be leveraged to overthrow a regime created an incentive to get rid of political reformers.
In each of the “color revolutions” and Iraq, the opposition was seen by the Russian elite not as popular movements for freedom but organized pro-Western proxies. Countering the U.S. was not simply about Russia’s military capability, but also about breaking the American “freedom agenda”. Stricter control of Russian society and the strengthening of nationalist propaganda occurred right after the color revolutions. By May 2014, the Russian military’s official policy listed color revolutions as a form of hybrid warfare used by the United States that represented the primary threat to Russia at present. It is noteworthy that as soon as Putin came to power, he crushed the opposition in Chechnya to remove a potential U.S. ally within Russia’s borders.
Putinism
Putin is a member of the siloviki, the intelligence and security elite that run Russia, so instinctively his goals are political and social stability. In commenting on the Soviet Union, he rejected the “shake-ups, cataclysms, and total makeovers” that accompanied the Communists coming to power. However, he deplored the chaos of post-Soviet Russia and prior to becoming president wrote that “society wants to see the guiding and regulating role of the state replenished to the appropriate degree.”
Putin’s early years in power were marked by an effort to shore up the infrastructure of presidential power. Fellow siloviki were placed in key positions across the government and state-owned corporations. Tax collection was tightened, and the budget was stabilized and then brought to a surplus. The war against separatist rebels in Chechnya was ramped up violently.
The operative methods of Putin’s system are state strength, limits on political contestation, popular legitimacy via managed elections, and appeals to nationalism. Notably, Putin’s administration has never transitioned to an unambiguous dictatorship. The siloviki are a powerful faction within the Russian state who have access to guns and state intelligence resources. However, this group is reactive and does not share a unified identity. They are unified by Putin’s patronage, not a common creed or overlapping interests. The siloviki are the conservative guard of the existing order loosely tied by shared interests, not a force for change that is a threat to Putin.
During the days of the USSR the siloviki controlled the so-called “Power Ministries”, which were the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the KGB (now the FSB). Yeltsin split up these agencies to make them less of a threat and, like all bureaucracies with overlapping missions, they squabble for power and resources. The remains of the three agencies have strong and independent identities so they are by no means a unified force. The FSB is obviously the most loyal to Putin, but the agency does not control large numbers of troops.
The MVD has traditionally been used to deal with domestic protests and has riot police and “Internal Troops” for this purpose. In 2016, Putin created the National Guard subordinate directly to him. The new agency acts as a praetorian guard for Putin and reduced the power of the MVD and FSB by taking personnel and resources away. Putin has just enough “organs of oppression” to avoid accountability, but not enough for a straight re-run of the Soviet empire.
Renewing the Empire
To be a Great Power, a nation must enjoy a certain degree of domestic security against foreign attack. That security can come in the form of military forces or alliances, but those can be expensive and unreliable. The best forms of security are provided by Mother Nature. Geography, topography, and other natural features can provide long-lasting – if not infinite – strategic advantages.
I discussed this topic in detail back in 2014:
Until 1999, Russia retained most of its “intermediate” buffer zone [against threats coming from Central Europe], see Map A. In 1999 NATO was expanded to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. That brought the border with NATO right to the core buffer of the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine. Russia’s situation became very disturbing to it in 2004 when the Baltics joined NATO along with Romania and Bulgaria (although Bulgaria has been edging back towards Russia recently).
With the buffers of Central Europe and its Eastern European satellites gone, Ukraine becomes Russia’s last geographic bulwark against invasion from the west.
Map B below gives us a view of the topography of Ukraine. Like Belarus and Central Russia, eastern and central Ukraine is a very low and flat plain. From a defensive standpoint, Russia is wide open along its border with Ukraine since there is no topographical anchor to build a defense upon. The closest such feature is the Dneiper River, which cuts through central Ukraine. If Russia were able to control the whole of Ukraine it would also benefit from the Dniester River and the Carpathian Mountains acting as natural barriers in western Ukraine.
However, Putin’s goals go beyond tactical control of Ukrainian territory. Strategic control of Ukraine is a necessity for Russia to be a Great Power. From Zbigniew Brzezinski’s seminal work The Grand Chessboard:
“The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically limited Russia’s geostrategic options. Even without the Baltic States and Poland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek to be the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in which Moscow could dominate the non-Slavs in the South and Southeast of the former Soviet Union. But without Ukraine and its 52 million fellow Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian empire was likely to leave Russia entangled alone in protracted conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused non-Slavs.”
Putin’s appeals to Eastern Slavic ethnic unity have been a constant theme:
“[W]e are not simply close neighbors but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source, and we cannot live without each other.”
I wrote about this in 2014:
It is important to note [Putin’s] choice of historical reference. By invoking the Rus’, Putin is reaching back to the Eastern Europe’s Dark Ages for a pre-national common link between the three Eastern Slavic countries. The Rus’ territory included all three countries and Ancient Rus’ served as the root language for the three branches of the language. Equally as important, the Rus’ empire was a federation of separate semi-states. Thus, it appears that Putin is pitching to Ukrainians and Belarusians that the three groups share a deep ethnic identity and as such should work for the common benefit of each other in the context of some degree of autonomy.
In his efforts to use a historical narrative to tie together modern-day Eastern Slavs, Putin shows that he has more on his mind than simply protecting Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Based on his own words, we suspect Putin sees himself as a modern-day Prince Rurik. By uniting the Eastern Slavic nations of today, Putin can recreate the Kieven Rus’ empire and dominate the tribes around him. Again, the simple fact that he has a strategy, and his western counterparts do not, makes him more likely to succeed. In the land of the blind, the man with one eye is king.”
As mentioned in the passage above from Brzezinski, the relative size of the Slav to non-Slav population is a key limiting factor on the potential domain over which a new Russian Empire can lay claim. To include energy-rich Central Asia in its empire, Russia must have enough Slavs to balance out the Turkic Muslims in those territories. The problem for Russia is that life expectancies and birth rates in the Slavic areas of Russia crashed to produce shrinking populations. While high birth rates and short life expectancies mean the Turkic Muslim population is growing larger and relatively younger to the Slavic areas of the former USSR. The clock is ticking for Putin to stitch together a rump USSR before the Muslim population vastly outnumbers the Slavic population. Also note that, at seventy-years old, Putin is over the average life expectancy for Russian men. The clock is ticking for him personally.
Closing the Door
For Russia, there are undeniable benefits to using force in Ukraine - even after taking account of wide-ranging sanctions by the West. Putin wants to remake the global security environment; he was going to need to upset the apple cart at some point. Being an empire requires acting with confidence. Russia’s invasion denies Ukraine entry into NATO indefinitely and, if victory is achieved, no U.S. presence in Ukraine will persist. Putin has gone all-in on the Ukraine invasion. If he backs down without overthrowing the government in Ukraine, the situation will be even worse. He must come out ahead and look daring, but without appearing reckless.
Putin wants to close NATO’s “open door” policy and create a sphere of influence where Russia has a veto on new NATO members. He has succeeded in forcing the U.S. to treat Europe as a theater of primary interest at a time when the Biden administration wants to pivot to Asia-Pacific. If the U.S. wants predictability and calm from Putin, it is going to need to meet a lot of Russian terms.
At the Munich Security Conference of 2007, Putin warned NATO against further expansion. He said, “the presence of a powerful military bloc on our borders...will be seen as a direct threat to our national security.” He was ignored, and in Spring 2008 Ukraine and Georgia were promised eventual membership in the alliance. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and continues to occupy portions of the country. Putin has shown time and again that he considers strategic control Russia’s near abroad to be an existential issue for the historic idea of Greater Russia, an idea he has dedicated his life to.
In his televised speech announcing the invasion, Putin made plain the fact that the reasons behind the war in Ukraine go far beyond what is happening in Ukraine. Note that Putin objects to American arrogance just as much as he does Russia’s mistreatment.
“Where did this insolent manner of talking down from the heights of their exceptionalism, infallibility, and all-permissiveness come from? … We saw a state of euphoria created by the feeling of absolute superiority, a kind of modern absolutism…”
“If history is any guide, we know in 1940 and early 1941 the Soviet Union went to great lengths to prevent war, or at least delay its outbreak. The attempt to appease the aggressor ahead of the Great Patriotic War proved to be a mistake which came at a high cost to our people.”
“For the United States and its allies, it is a geopolitical policy of containing Russia, with obvious geopolitical dividends. For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation. This is not an exaggeration; this is a fact.”
Two days before the invasion of Ukraine the Russian Duma added prison time to a law that bans equating the goals of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Putin is acting like Stalin in the 1930s in his attempt to reconfigure the geopolitical balance of power. He has enlarged his state with claims to territory that was once part of a larger empire. Putin has also launched “special operations” in the name of peace, like Stalin did in Poland. Putin does not mind being equated with Stalin, but he cannot allow a narrative to take hold that equates Stalin with Hitler. Win, lose, or draw, this great game being played by Putin does not end in Ukraine.
The Anti-Russia
In his July 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, Putin discusses what he views as Western encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence.
“Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ‘Ukraine is not Russia’ was no longer an option. There was the need for the anti-Russia concept, which we will never accept.”
To have an “anti-Russia” regime in Ukraine, which is part of Russia in Putin’s view, is too much to bear. Of course, Putin’s brusque handling of Ukraine’s political crisis in 2014 sowed the seeds for Kiev’s interest in appealing to “the West”. But therein lies the cruelty of “the West’s” actions. Putin was always more likely to beat Ukraine into submission than NATO was to defend its independence.
Putin’s initial action in 2014 was to secure the Crimean Peninsula, a strategic necessity. But then he forced a difficult choice on Ukraine, either foreswear military cooperation with the West and federalize, or risk losing more land. During the protests that shook Kiev in 2014, it initially appeared an establishment character would take over from pro-Russian President Yanukovych. Instead, the radical wing of the nationalists took over. Putin’s plan had backfired, but he did not fold.
Putin sees the current government in Kyiv as the product of a pro-Western coup, and therefore illegitimate. In his view, the government is trying to establish legitimacy by being an “anti-Russia” and America’s “gang” is provoking confrontation. U.S. support for Ukraine has been substantial since ramping up from 2014. From 2015-2020 USAID from the State Department averaged $420 billion per year and was $464 billion in 2021. From 2014-2021 the U.S. provided $2.5 billion of security assistance.
In June 2020 Ukraine became one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a status granted to six close non-NATO countries. In 2018 and 2019 the Department of Defense sold Ukraine a total of 360 Javelins. In 2020, sales were expanded to include anti-ship and coastal defense systems were included. A qualitative update of Ukraine’s military capabilities was in the process of taking place and even accelerating. Time was working against Putin as the deep pockets of Ukraine’s new friends threatened to undermine Russia’s historic advantage against its smaller neighbor.
Yes, Prime Minister
Prior to entering politics, Zelensky was a comedian on a TV series, Servant of the People, about an outspoken teacher who gets elected after a political rant goes viral online. The Servant of the People political party was created, and art became life. However, Zelensky’s virtue turned out to be only skin deep and over the course of 2021 he was shown to be as corrupt as other leading Ukrainian politicians. Zelensky’s disapproval rating climbed above fifty percent and most voters did not want him to participate in future elections.
In 2019, Zelensky’s party won 60% of the seats in parliament – the first outright majority in Ukraine’s history – but his support fell over the course of 2020 and 2021. In 2021, Zelensky turned to the post-Soviet playbook of building a “power vertical”. A power vertical creates a chain of subordination and loyalty to the president in all branches and levels of government, allowing a subversion of checks and balances. Servant of the People failed to establish control of the local councils, so Zelensky has been running an unofficial congress of local and regional authorities. Zelensky’s name was included in the Pandora papers and his supporters have defended him by saying “everybody does it”.
Zelensky’s “de-oligarchization” has been criticized by the Council of Europe because it could easily be politicized – and so it has. Zelensky was supported by Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky, an enemy of then-President Poroshenko. The “de-oligarchization” campaign has heavily targeted Petro Poroshenko, Viktor Medvedchuk and Rinat Akhmetov – all political rivals – but Zelensky’s benefactors have gone unmolested.
The National Security & Defense Council (NSDC) has been the center of decision-making since October 2020. The NSDC runs the Register of Oligarchs, which was created in legislation passed in late-September 2021. The Council has bypassed the courts to place sanctions on Constitutional Court justices, oligarchs, and pro-Russian opposition leaders. In Fall 2021, a purge took place in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ukrainian Army with Zelensky loyalists being placed in key positions.
Sanctions against the oligarchs were surprising and politically explosive because in the past the NSDC never targeted individual citizens. Medvedchuk, head of the “Opposition Platform – For Life” party, was placed under house arrest and charged with treason. His TV stations were shut down in early 2021. In late-2021, Zelensky began a conflict with Akhmetov, whose media companies heavily criticized the anti-oligarch bill. On November 30th the Rada passed an “anti- Akhmetov” bill that increased taxes on iron-ore makers. Petro Poroshenko, no friend of Russia, has also been charged with treason for selling coal to the separatist areas.
Russian intelligence services apparently commissioned opinion polls late 2021 to determine whether the Ukrainian people would fight for the current government. The opinion polls reported high levels of political apathy any cynicism about the direction of the country. Putin seems to have taken those results as a sign that many Ukrainians would not mind if he personally intervened in the running of their country. This is the thought process of someone who had his leaders imposed on him throughout his life. Not realizing that Ukrainians could hate all the options but still love having options, Putin believed that, with so many clocks ticking, now was the time to spring his trap.
Timing of the Invasion
Putin would not let Ukraine become another “frozen conflict” because it was too strategically important. The Kremlin is genuinely concerned that Ukraine will eventually join NATO. A qualitative upgrade of military equipment was taking place in Ukraine as the country became the second largest recipient of U.S. military assistance.
Putin tried and failed in his attempts to control Ukraine via energy prices and by forcing the separatist oblasts back into a federalized state. In a 2021 article Putin wrote “apparently, Kiev does not need Donbas.” Putin’s plan set in motion by the Minsk Agreement fell apart and the U.S. and Europe have succeeded in propping up Ukraine. Clearly, in 2021 he came to the conclusion that more drastic measures would be necessary.
The geopolitical landscape looked right to stage an invasion as 2021 came to a close, with a new government in Germany and a politically divided Europe. The U.S. had a new(ish) president and was on the back foot diplomatically after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia had rebuilt its foreign currency reserves (over $600 billion) and was ready to act more aggressively with oil prices well above the $40 fiscal break-even. At the same time, Ukraine was becoming an unofficial member of NATO and was taking increased deliveries of anti-tank missiles and Turkish drones.
In 2020 and 2021, Russia reasserted itself as a military force and provider of security in Eurasia. Intervention in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war and putting down domestic revolts in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Only Ukraine and the three Baltic countries remain outside the Russian sphere of influence.
Revolution in Russia?
The ‘American Dream’ is that Russia suddenly wakes up one day “gets it” and turns into East America. That is the driving force behind expectations of some sort of political uprising in Russia against Putin. Endless hours will be spent on cable television gaming out scenarios where it might occur, but that is a waste of time. Anything is possible, but unless Putin becomes unable to function, I see no reason to expect internally driven regime change. As discussed above, the threat of color revolutions was recognized and dealt with already. Anyone who the West might have worked with is already in prison, or dead.
The power system in Russia is built on the accumulation of capital from the sale of natural resources, rather than innovation or consumerism. Unlike Western leaders, Russia’s elite are not beholden to borrowing costs. The siloviki are ready to brutally suppress democratic movements to keep getting paid. There are about two million of them and their commitment to security and stability keeps Putin in power.
Putin’s annexation of Crimea was hugely popular, and he might have been looking for a repeat boost before the 2024 presidential election in Russia. It remains to be seen whether Putin will benefit in the polls from Ukraine, but it unlikely to be his downfall. Note that 67% of Russians reported approving completely or somewhat with the Russian intervention in Kazakhstan. In addition, polls indicate Putin has done a good job of getting the Russian public to see the U.S. as the aggressor in Ukraine. As discussed above, taking a step back from the immediate circumstances shows Putin has a point about this.
The Long Peace
The Cold War may someday be called the “Long Peace”, to use the phrase coined by John Lewis Gaddis. The complexity of the “geometry” of power is important in maintaining peace. A bipolar system lends itself to strict alliances where weaker powers are secure from each other as well as major powers. Balancing power is difficult in a multipolar system because there are numerous opportunities for a power imbalance to develop. Alliances are shuffled until an imbalance invites aggression.
When there is competition for security it becomes difficult for states to cooperate in an environment of economic liberalism. When security is scarce countries worry about relative gains, rather than just absolute gains. Interdependence creates vulnerability, which can breed aggression just as easily as it can cooperation. Unfortunately, a little bit of insecurity goes a long way because of the so-called “security dilemma”.
The “security dilemma” is that by making preparations for a less secure world, you frequently make others less secure. In short, until everybody feels safe, nobody is safe. Thus, the prospects for international trade and the global liberal order depend heavily on how everyone feels coming out of the war in Ukraine – gulp.
Commitment problems mean that nobody will believe any treaties that come after the war and only security deployments will make people feel safe. The relationship with the U.S. intensified in 2021 and Ukraine began to put a lot of focus on regional forums. These forums include Association Trio (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), Lublin Triangle (Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania), and Quadriga Format (Ukraine, Turkey).
Putin feels NATO broke its promise not to expand towards Russia and he sees Ukraine as collateral damage in his effort to fight a historical injustice. After such a long period in power, Putin seems himself as responsible for the post-Soviet world order. He is looking for a “do-over” of 1997 and the current war is part of a much larger project. Prospect theory states that humans are more willing to take risk to avoid losses than they will to secure gains.
Putin knows he has a lot to lose in Ukraine, so he will not back down before he secures his goals. Already Russia is ramping up its use of heavy artillery, always the mainstay of its armed forces. Russia has been holding back thus far because it cannot wage the precision warfare that NATO does. But moral condemnation and economic sanctions will not stop a country from acting to protect its security. If it takes fifty or one-hundred thousand dead to pacify Ukraine, Putin will abide it.
Short War, Long War
With enough material support, volunteers, and time, NATO could probably bleed Russia dry in Ukraine like it did in Afghanistan. But before supporting such a policy in Ukraine, NATO members should question whether supporting Bin Laden’s Merry Men turned out to be such a good idea. Perhaps Russia can be pushed out after years of bloody warfare, but is that really necessary?
Ukraine has no defensive value for the other members of NATO geographically and has no military resources to speak of that it can offer NATO. Ukraine can only be useful to NATO as an offensive tool – to prevent its control by Russia and provide easy access to Russia’s sensitive areas. Indeed, experience has already shown that associating itself with NATO has made Ukraine less secure, not more.
If the world is to act in the best interest of Ukraine, and treat Russia as a Great Power, then Ukraine should be encouraged to declare neutrality and unilaterally end the war immediately. The way to make Ukraine safer is by making Russia feel safe, not by making Ukraine stronger. The war will become more destructive for Ukraine and the world will become progressively less safe if NATO continues putting just enough weight on the scale to prevent Russia from an outright win. A conflict in Ukraine that drags on for years could spread to the rest of the Caucuses and likely into the Middle East.
The key for U.S. security is to reject the post-Cold War policy of Donald Rumsfeld, the anti-detant Cold Warrior was one of the remaining Reagan Tribe sent to babysit Bush the Younger during his time in Office. As discussed above, the members of the Greatest Generation that made up the Regan Administration had a healthy respect for the Russians after fighting with them against the Nazis. However, by the year 2000 there were few Reaganites still in working condition – Cheney was on his fourth heart attack. Indeed, Rumsfeld was brought in against Bush-family policy of hiring former rivals.
Thus, as policymaking shifted from the Greatest Generation to the Baby Boomers during the Clinton Administration, a “Great Carelessness” ensued. When the Republicans took power again, a Boomer was in the top office and the only Reaganites still standing were the warmongers. Rumsfeld, like Clemenceau, saw himself in a position to do as much damage as possible to an eternal enemy and he did so with gusto. The Bush Administration made friends in Eastern Europe and started handing out NATO admissions like band t-shirts at a concert – even Albania got in!
Conclusion
The timing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was certainly a surprise, but it would be a mistake to write-off Putin as a madman or to think Russian can be turned back with anything short of war. Putin’s internal position is simply too secure, and control of Ukraine is too valuable a strategic asset to give up because of sanctions.
Ukraine became a US ally without any debate about the message being sent to Russia or whether there was any benefit to the U.S. Russia views prevention of a pro-Western Ukraine as a core strategic interest. It will go to great lengths to prevent this. Short of going to war on Ukraine’s behalf, there is nothing NATO can do. A smarter policy by the West would remove the that make Russia feel the need to stage the invasion in the first place.
Indeed, Russia offered a rushed proposal to “go back to Germany” in Fall 2021. Obviously, a “do-over” of 1997 is not going to happen, but the proposal and Putin’s subsequent statements hint at the outline of a deal. At the end of the day, Russia simply wants to be taken seriously in its own back yard. In the post-World War II era, the United States has militarily intervened in the Dominican Republic (1963), Grenada (1982), and Panama (1983). Of course, numerous other clandestine interventions have occurred.
In terms of motives, Putin is a Soviet Baby Boomer and one of the last of his generation. The USSR was good to him, coming from a working-class family, and many others his age that currently run Russia. Turning seventy this year, Putin likely feels a duty to get back something of “the good old days” for those too young to remember.
For investors, the likelihood of the world returning to some sense of order depends heavily on American policymakers taking Russia seriously, rather than acting like “tough guys”. If Russia and China can be made to feel safe, they will stop being a threat to countries around them. However, if a tit-for-tat security escalation takes place there are only degrees of badness. In the best case, global trade is seriously impacted, and inflation pressure is much higher because capital expenditure is needed to build factories locally all over the world. The worst case is deteriorating security that leads to more warfare. The sooner the conflict in Ukraine can be brought to an end by removing the threat to Russia, the less damage will be done to the post-Cold War order.
A passage from George Keenan’s 1947 article (written under the pseudonym ‘X’) provides sound advice for American policymakers trying to fashion a post-Cold War global order.
“United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’. While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism.”
References
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Brainerd, E. Mortality in Russia Since the Fall of the Soviet Union. Comp Econ Stud 63, 557–576 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41294-021-00169-w
Colton, T. J. (2017). Paradoxes of Putinism. Daedalus, 146(2), 8–18. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48563056
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Pyle, William, Russians' "Impressionable Years": Life Experience During the Exit from Communism and Putin-Era Beliefs (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8379, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3635174
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X. (1947). The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs, 25(4), 566–582. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030065